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Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-offs and Sorting
* 
 
The two key predictions of hedonic wage theory are that there is a trade-off between wages 
and nonmonetary rewards and that the latter can be used as a sorting device by firms to 
attract and retain the kind of employees they desire. Empirical analysis of these topics are 
scarce as they require detailed data on all monetary as well as nonmonetary rewards, not 
only for the job chosen but also for alternative offers. In this paper this data predicament is 
solved by the use of the vignettes method to estimate individuals’ willingness to pay for fringe 
benefits and job amenities. We find clear negative wage-fringe trade-offs, considerable 
heterogeneity in willingness to pay for fringe benefits, and signs of sorting. The findings imply 
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In this paper we collect data which allow us to estimate employees￿Willing-
ness-to-Pay (WtP) for nonpecuniary bene￿ts. The aim of our study is three-
fold: to empirically investigate whether the expected trade-o⁄ exists, and
whether or not there are any signs of sorting. In addition to demonstrating
the trade-o⁄ between pay and individual fringes and amenities, we also ex-
amine the extent to which employees di⁄er in their WtP for nonpecuniary
bene￿ts. This information is important for employers in deciding on the de-
sign of compensation packages. Furthermore, our analysis informs us about
di⁄erences in the WtP for di⁄erent ￿quantities￿of the fringes. Lastly, this
paper also seeks to demonstrate that this relatively simple tool-kit can be
used in larger organizations or across smaller enterprises, and may assist
managers in putting together more e¢ cient compensation packages, given
any special needs they may have. E¢ ciency is a cornerstone in personnel
economics (Lazear and Oyer, 2010), and the vignettes method has the po-
tential to provide companies with a tool to detect possible ine¢ ciencies and
hence to increase pro￿ts.
The inclusion of nonmonetary bene￿ts and job amenities as important
parts of employees￿ compensation packages has proliferated across many
countries in recent years, see e.g. Society for Human Ressource Management,
Annual Reports. From an economic perspective providing nonmonetary
bene￿ts can be rational behavior on the part of both employer and employees
for three reasons. First, exploiting scale economies employers can sometimes
acquire these goods at a lower cost than single employees. Occasionally,
the fringe bene￿ts may also be taxed less heavily than income from work.
Second, including nonpecuniary bene￿ts in compensation packages can also
act as a sorting device to attract and retain key employees (Oyer, 2008).
Still a third way of thinking about nonmonetary compensation, common in
industrial psychology studies, is to consider nonmonetary rewards as status
and identity aspects of a job or position, and as complementary rather than
as substitutes for monetary rewards (Milkovich and Newman, 2010).
Given the prevalence of bene￿ts it is natural to ask how employers should
2use fringe bene￿ts and nonmonetary rewards. Should they use cafeteria
plans, that is, o⁄er their employees a menu of possible bene￿ts? Or should
they apply more precisely targeted bene￿ts? The hedonic model of compen-
sation (Rosen, 1974), provides a useful analytical framework to understand
the relevant mechanisms.
In designing its compensation policies, including nonpecuniary bene￿ts,
the ￿rm faces two choices. The ￿rst choice is to select bene￿ts that provide
incentives for workers to perform better, i.e. productivity enhancing bene-
￿ts, such as pension systems that encourage human capital investments or
working time ￿ exibility arrangements which lower employees￿cost of e⁄ort.
The di¢ culty here is that since bene￿ts are costly, the employer needs to
weigh the productivity gain to the increase in costs. In this setting, a trade-
o⁄ arises as the hedonic model predicts a negative trade-o⁄ between wages
and nonmonetary rewards like ￿ exibility, home-pc or company car.
The second choice is about ￿nding combinations of pay and nonmonetary
bene￿ts that attract the kind of workers the ￿rm desires. How many and
which kind of nonmonetary bene￿ts the ￿rm will o⁄er is consequently the
outcome of the interaction of workers￿preferences, the ￿rm￿ s cost structure
and desire to attract speci￿c types of labor. The key insight o⁄ered by the
hedonic model is that fringe bene￿ts and nonmonetary compensation can
be used actively as a sorting device. Carefully designed, a compensation
package may induce the type of applicants, which the employer wants, and
concurrently screen-out applicants that do not ￿t the desired pro￿le of the
workplace.
Although these principles are widely recognized as e¢ cient behavior by
rational agents, there is relatively little empirical evidence.
First, it has proven rather di¢ cult to provide evidence of the trade-o⁄
between monetary and nonmonetary bene￿ts predicted by the hedonic util-
ity model, Brown (1980), Duncan and Holmlund (1983) and Gronberg and
Reed (1994), Oyer (2008). The main reason for the di¢ culties involved is
that it is virtually impossible to gather ￿eld data that allow for this type of
estimation. Consider the sort of data needed to test for a negative trade-
o⁄ between bene￿ts and pay. Not only should we observe an employee￿ s
3current compensation package in the job she has chosen, and she has been
chosen for, but we also need to observe alternative o⁄ers she may have re-
ceived. Moreover, one needs to control for the employee￿ s observable as well
unobservable skills as these are likely to be positively correlated with both
the monetary and nonmonetary rewards received by the employee. Obvi-
ously, neither register nor survey data are likely to contain this information.
Using job o⁄ers given to postdoctoral biologists, Stern (2004) provides one
important exemption for the lack of suitable data, and ￿nds that, indeed,
scientists do pay to be scientists.
Second, there is even less evidence available on the extent to which com-
pensation packages serve as sorting mechanisms. The seminal paper by Salop
and Salop (1976) focuses on di⁄erent forms of compensation as a means to
induce the most productive workers to join the ￿rm. Oyer￿ s (2008) theo-
retical model is concerned with the use of bene￿ts to sort employees based
on their tastes. His empirical analysis, which is based on individuals￿self-
reported bene￿t eligibility information (NLSY), shows that employees who
are likly to value certain bene￿ts (employer provided meals and dental and
health insurance) more, are employed at ￿rms providing them.
A key novelty of this paper is the type of data we exploit to estimate WtP
for the nonpecuniary aspects of compensation packages. We use survey data
and ask respondents to choose between two ￿ctive jobs described in so-called
vignettes. The vignette method has earlier been used extensively in other
￿elds but rarely in labor economics. Early studies appeared in marketing
research (Green and Rao 1971, Green and Srinivasan, 1978), while trans-
port economics (Ben-Akiva et al., 1993), and environmental and resource
economics (Adamowicz et al., 1998) are examples of disciplines within the
economic realm that have used this approach. In labor economics, van Beek
et al. (1997) also make use of vignettes although their objective di⁄ers from
ours. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst time vignettes are applied
in the context of eliciting individuals￿Willingness-to-Pay for fringe bene￿ts.
The personnel economics literature has contributed to a better under-
standing of a wide range of questions related to human resource management
practices, such as teamwork, promotions, incentive pay and the use of fringe
4bene￿ts; see Lazear and Shaw (2007), Lazear and Oyer (2010) and Oyer
and Schaefer (2010) for recent overviews. If it can be shown empirically
that there is a negative trade-o⁄ between nonmonetary rewards and wages,
and that sorting does matter, this will be an important ￿nding as it im-
plies that all the models in personnel economics apply not only to monetary
rewards but also to nonmonetary rewards.
Previewing our main ￿ndings, they are brie￿ y as follows. First and
foremost, we ￿nd clear evidence of negative wage-fringe bene￿t trade-o⁄s.
Moreover, the analysis documents large di⁄erences in how individuals value
fringe bene￿ts. We ￿nd considerable di⁄erences in willingness-to-pay for
fringe bene￿ts both within and between demographic groups. When com-
paring individuals￿willingness-to-pay for speci￿c bene￿ts with whether they
receive them in the jobs they currently hold, we observe fairly strong positive
relations suggesting that employers use compensation packages as a means
of sorting of their employees.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In the next section we
brie￿ y discuss the hedonic wage model. Section 3 includes a description
of vignettes and the sample of respondents are given. Section 4 presents
the econometric method employed and the ￿fth section gives the empirical
results. Section 6 contains a discussion of the economic implications of our
￿ndings and section 7 concludes.
2 The Hedonic Compensation Model
The hedonic compensation model described in Rosen￿ s (1974) seminal analy-
sis focuses mainly on the cost side of fringe bene￿ts and job attributes. The
key trade-o⁄ in the analysis is between bene￿ts and pay, i.e., the balance
between o⁄ering more bene￿ts and less pay. In the simplest possible model,
workers are assumed to have identical preferences regarding bene￿ts. As
these, like wages, are goods, the trade-o⁄ can be described by means of
a downward-sloping convex indi⁄erence curve in bene￿t and wage space.
Once a ￿rm knows the slope of the indi⁄erence curve it can choose the
correct combination of wage and bene￿t o⁄ers.
5Allowing for heterogeneous preferences, that is, acknowledging the fact
that di⁄erent individuals place di⁄erent weights on bene￿ts and wages,
makes things more complicated. A simple example is o⁄ered by Lazear
(1998) and reproduced in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Imagine two employees: one is a chess player during his leisure time and
the other likes to windsurf. Windsur￿ng depends on the weather and the
windsurfer therefore places more value on ￿ exible working time vis-￿-vis the
chess player. This is shown in Figure 1 where the windsurfer is more willing
to trade-o⁄ wage earnings for ￿ ex-time compared to the chess player.
Thus, hedonic compensation theory tells us that willingness to pay for
fringe bene￿ts and job amenities varies with employee type, and that ￿rms
can try to make the workers it desires self-sort as employees to the ￿rm by
choosing appropriate wage-bene￿t combinations.
3 Data
Data were collected through an internet based survey launched in May 2009
on a panel of Danish respondents.1 In order to have a sample of respondents
who were likely to hold jobs and to receive job o⁄ers where remuneration po-
tentially includes fringe bene￿ts and other nonmonetary rewards, ￿ve sample
selection criteria were utilized. The respondent should:
￿ have completed high school or higher education.
￿ be in the age range 25 to 64.
￿ be employed, i.e., we exclude students, self- and unemployed.
￿ work minimum 30 hours per week in her main occupation.
￿ not be employed in the primary sector, e.g., in farms, ￿sheries.
￿ not be a CEO or a top level manager.
An invitation to participate was sent out to 10,000 members of the re-
1The panel of potential respondents is kept by the private survey institute YouGov-
Zapera, which also undertook the data collection.
6spondents panel; 6,300 responded of which 3,094 matched our selection cri-
teria.
Given this screening procedure it is not surprising that the ￿nal sam-
ple contains relatively many highly educated respondents ￿more than 50
percent have 3-4 years of college or higher education.2 The corresponding
share in the overall Danish population is about 25 percent. Consequently,
the mean gross monthly income is also high, about 35,000 DKK (6,400 USD)
as compared to the population mean of about 22,000 DKK (4,000 USD).3
The female labor participation rate is high in Denmark; nevertheless, the 51
percent female share in the sample is also above the population share of 47
per cent females in the workforce. In the econometric analysis we limit the
sample to individuals who work between 30 and 73 hours per week.
3.1 The Vignettes
Although the intuition is clear ￿there is likely to be a trade-o⁄ between
fringe bene￿ts and wages ￿ it has proven very hard to verify this claim
empirically. A data-predicament arises from the fact that we rarely observe
employees￿compensation packages and we virtually never observe what they
alternatively could have chosen, i.e. their outside options.
Here, we solve this problem by building vignettes, in which respon-
dents are o⁄ered a series of ￿ctive choices between two alternating job-
compensation packages. Faced with two job-compensation packages, A and
B, the respondent is asked to choose one for the other and this exercise
is repeated 7 times per respondent, each time with di⁄erent values for the
variables that characterize the job-compensation package.
To ￿ esh out the idea further, consider the example given in Figure 2
2See Table C1, Appendix C for a list of average, min and max of the variables included
in the data set.
3We here use the exchange rate as of May 2009 where one USD = 5,464 DKK. Note
that the min and max columns reveal some extreme outliers. They are deleted from
the regression analyses. We choose to delete the top and bottom percentile of the income
distribution. This yields an average monthly income of 32,868 DKK (6,015) and minimum
of 13,000 DKK (2,380 USD) and maximum of 100,000 DKK (18,300 USD). Given the very
compressed income distribution in Denmark these remain rather extreme values (note that
we also excluded self-employed, CEO￿ s and other top level managers).
7below. A vignette in the left column includes all attributes describing the
job. These attributes do not change between vignettes but their values
change between choice situations. This yields variation in the data that
allows us to identify parameter values. In order to induce a high degree of
variation in the possible combinations 70 di⁄erent vignettes were applied.
See Appendix B for further details on the introductory text and attribute
levels.
[Figure 2 about here]
In the example given in Figure 2, the respondent may choose Job A in
which she is o⁄ered a complete health insurance ￿something the alternative,
Job B, does not o⁄er. However, opting for the health insurance comes at
a cost since Job B o⁄ers a higher wage (5% more than Job A), 5 days
of training per year and ￿ exible work hours. In the example, two of the
attributes, "Home-pc + ADSL internet" and "Annual bonus (equivalent
to one month￿ s pay)" are held constant across the two alternatives. In
other vignettes these could vary while, typically, one or more of the other
attributes would then be held constant.
3.2 Data Description
For the purpose of this paper we are especially interested in the amount
of fringe and job amenities each employee receives in her current job as we
examine whether there are any signs of sorting. About three out of four
respondents, 73 percent, did not receive a bonus in 2008, see Table 1. This
is well in accordance with the survey evidence of ￿rms in the European
Company Survey (2009) and a survey of exclusively Danish ￿rms, Eriksson
(2010), carried out in the same year.
[Tables 1 & 2 about here]
Despite the uniform coverage of free public health in Denmark, demand
for private health insurance has recently grown markedly ￿mainly as a result
8of long waiting lists in the public health care sector. Consequently, about 35
percent of the respondents have some type of private health insurance, see
Table 2. The most common and least costly fringes are free co⁄ee and fruit,
whereas the most costly, company cars, are relatively rare (only 4 percent).4
Employer provided training is among the job amenities investigated in
this paper. As can be seen from Table 3, about 15 percent never received
training while an additional 25 percent had not received employer provided
training in the current year, but had so in previous years. Among respon-
dents who received some training in 2008, most had been in training for less
than two weeks.5
[Table 3 about here]
4 Econometric Framework for the Hedonic Model
The starting point for estimating Willingness to Pay (WtP) for job at-
tributes is a simple utility function, U,
Unjt = ￿nxnjt + "njt (1)
where utility from alternative j in choice situation t for individual n is given
by equation (1). ￿ is a parameter vector and x is a matrix that includes
vignette characteristics and background variables interacted with vignette
characteristics. The coe¢ cients ￿n are distributed with density f(￿ j ￿),
where ￿ refers to the mean and covariance of ￿. The error term "njt is
assumed to be iid extreme value distributed over time, people and alterna-
tives. This is the mixed logit model with a continuous mixing distribution,
4Most prevalent in the ￿ other￿category are ￿free lunch￿ , newspaper, employee shares
and products from the company.
5These numbers are very much in line with those found in a major Danish survey
conducted in 2006, see Trepartsudvalget (2006). The share of employees in the entire
population who never received training is higher than 15 percent since employees with no
high school degree (not included here) tend to have a relatively lower training propensity.
9see Revelt and Train (1998), Train (2003), which can be estimated using
simulated maximum likelihood. The coe¢ cient vector can be expressed as
￿n = b + ￿n; where b is the population mean, and ￿n is individual n￿ s sto-
chastic deviation from the average in the population. The estimated utility
function can now be expressed as Unjt = b0
nxnjt + ￿0
nxnjt + "njt: The sto-
chastic part (￿0
nxnjt+"njt) can be correlated over alternatives and time, and
therefore this model allows for very general patterns of substitution between
alternatives.6
An estimate of the Willingness-to-Pay is usually obtained by dividing a
parameter for a given characteristic with a cost parameter; see Revelt and
Train (1998). In this application, we use the wage-parameter as the implicit
￿cost￿ . The idea is to estimate WtP for nonmonetary rewards, which in
turn enables us to answer questions of the following type: How much more
of, say, ￿ exibility should you have in order to be fully compensated for a






We estimate mean and standard deviation of the WtP for all vignette
attributes. However, to ease the computational burden, we only estimate
mean e⁄ects of all interaction terms between vignette attributes and observ-
able characteristics.8
6Importantly, the mixed logit model does not exhibit Independence of Irrelavant Al-
ternatives (IIA).
7Technically, we simply di⁄erentiate equation (1) and set it equal to zero. Constant
utility is then obtained by increasing the amount of at least one bene￿t while lowering
the wage (provided all features of the package are considered ￿positive￿ , which is the case
here).
8In the Simulated ML we used 100 repetitions. The random coe¢ cents are gener-
ally assumed to follow a normal distribution. A log-normal distribution is applied as a
sensitivity check.
105 Results
We ￿rst present results from estimation of a simple conditional logit and
compare these with parameter estimates from a mixed logit, see Models (1)
and (2) in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
The mean coe¢ cients of the mixed logit model are generally higher than
the estimated parameters from the conditional logit model.9 The fact that
the magnitude of the di⁄erences in many of the estimated parameters is
about a factor of two indicates that the random parameters explain a lot
of the variance in unobserved utility. Indeed, with the exception of "Bonus
with 25% chance", we ￿nd that all random parameters are highly signi￿cant,
and that their estimated coe¢ cients are relatively high compared to their
mean values.
All coe¢ cients have the expected positive sign.10 This has the impor-
tant implication that there indeed is a trade-o⁄ between the nonmonetary
bene￿ts and the wage.
One key advantage of vignettes is that respondents are faced with similar
choice situations. However, in this study the vignettes describe ￿ctive jobs
and the wage is described relative (in percent) to the respondent￿ s current
wage. Answers to a question about the respondent￿ s own wage subsequently
enabled us to estimate the model. Obviously, this approach requires that we
control for respondent￿ s own wage. This is implemented by introducing an
interaction term between each of the vignettes and an indicator for whether
or not the respondent￿ s own wage is above or below the median wage in our
9The unobserved variation contained in "njt is much larger in the logit model. Hence,
in order to normalize "njt to have the appropriate variance of an extreme value distribution
it has to be normalized by a higher value in the logit model compared to the mixed logit
model. As the ￿-parameters are normalized by the same value as ", this normalization
explains the di⁄erence in the ￿ values in the two models.
10In Model (2) there is one exception in "Bonus with 50% chance", which is insigni￿cant.
Once we control for the respondent￿ s own wage, as in Model (3), the coe¢ cient for this
parameter becomes positive and highly signi￿cant.
11sample, see Model (3) in Table 4.11 As expected, it is relevant to control
for the respondent￿ s own wage. Notably, ￿ exibility, ￿ve days of training and
pc + internet are valued signi￿cantly higher among respondents in the top
half of the wage distribution. The increased log-likelihood also indicates a
better ￿t of the data.12
The estimated random coe⁄cients are assumed to be normally distrib-
uted. This implies that, while most respondents may place a relatively high
value on the various vignette attributes, there is a proportion of the re-
spondents who place a negative value on the attribute. By de￿nition, the
assumption of normally distributed random coe¢ cients yield WtP-estimates
where the sign changes across the distribution of respondents since the nor-
mal distribution is de￿ned from minus in￿nity to in￿nity. Alternatively, the
random coe¢ cients could be assumed to follow some other known distribu-
tion, like the log-normal distribution, which is de￿ned from zero to in￿nity.
Hence, with the log-normal assumption we impose a restriction that ensures
that all individuals place a positive value on the attribute.
[Table 5 about here]
The results from this sensitivity analysis, see Table 5, indicate that both
the mean value and the standard deviation change only little. In addition,
the log-likelihood value is virtually constant. Although the log-normal as-
sumption is appealing, it does not come without a cost. The lognormal
distribution exacerbates the problem in the right-most part of the distrib-
ution (as it has a thicker upper tail). In addition, it is often very hard to
obtain convergence with the log-normal assumption imposed. In the fol-
11Arguably, this is a rather crude manner to control for income. It is chosen here because
it facilitates interpretation of the results. Introducing own wage as a continuous variable
or using dummies for quantiles makes little di⁄erence.
12In all three models of Table 4 the coe¢ cients are estimated under the assumption that
they are independently and identically distributed. However, the simple mixed logit model
in column (2) of Table 4 has also been estimated allowing for correlated random coe¢ -
cients. This speci￿cation is much more computer-intensive and thus greatly increases the
computational burden. The estimated mean coe¢ cients (not shown) rise somewhat, which
again re￿ ects that this extension to the model captures more of the variance. However,
the ratios between coe¢ cients, the WtPs, change much less.
12lowing, we therefore continue with the assumption of normally distributed
random coe¢ cients but note that one needs to interpret the results with due
caution, especially in the tails of the distribution.13
In the following, the speci￿cation of the model is extended with a series
of observable covariates that intuitively, one could think are linked to the
utility of one or more of the nonmonetary goods described by the vignette
attributes. Given the high number of parameters to be estimated we do not
allow the coe¢ cients to be correlated.14
5.1 Willingness-to-Pay for Nonmonetary Job Attributes and
Fringe Bene￿ts
One of the key insights from the hedonic utility model is that individuals
di⁄er in their valuation of nonmonetary rewards. We therefore extend the
model speci￿cation by interaction terms between vignette characteristics
and indicator variables for female, good physical health (self-reported), age
57 or above, children below age 6 in the household, low level of education,
and an indicator variable for long commuting time between home and work.
The estimated coe¢ cients are given in Table C2 in the Appendix. All pa-
rameters for the vignette attributes have the expected signs, and are highly
signi￿cant (with the exception of 2 days of training). Respondents value
the vignette attributes very di⁄erently; most of the random coe¢ cients are
highly signi￿cant and have relatively high parameter values as compared to
the corresponding mean estimates.
Based on the coe¢ cients in Table C2 we can compute WtP for the vi-
gnette attributes; these are shown in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here]
13This precaution is necessary for any distribution one may chose. The basic issue is
that an unrestricted distribution necessarily gives implausible results for some share of the
population. This issue is described in detail by Revelt and Train (1998, footnote 14 pp.
655-656).
14The computational burden simply becomes insurmountable given the number of ob-
servations and the number of parameters.
13The mean WtP for both health packages and for both levels of ￿ exibility
is quite high. In particular, it is probably not realistic that respondents
would be willing to pay almost 400 USD/month for ￿Some ￿ exibility￿ , al-
though ￿ exibility often is given a very high priority, Bender et al. (2005).15
It seems likely that there is some degree of ￿hypothetical bias￿here, whereby
respondents "o⁄er" to pay more in hypothetical choice situations compared
to their true preferences revealed through real out-of-pocket purchases, List
(2001).16
However, having accounted for this possibility we may also note that the
other parameter estimates appear quite plausible. For instance, the cost of
internet (ADSL) and a home-pc would amount to about 100 USD/month,
which is in line with our mean estimate, and the value of one month￿ s bonus
multiplied with the chance of receiving it is, on average, lower than our 25%
estimate but higher than our 50% estimate.
One advantage of the mixed logit is that the willingness-to-pay can be
given a graphical presentation, which facilitates interpretation and especially
serves to underscore the importance of the entire distribution of WtPs. Fig-
ure 3 demonstrates that, while the mean WtP for ￿ exibility is estimated
to be around 400 USD per month, respondents do place very di⁄erent val-
ues on ￿ exibility, and the distribution consequently becomes very wide. Not
surprisingly, the distribution is widest for the high level of ￿ exibility. As one
could expect, some employees value ￿ exibility a lot while others pay little
attention to this job characteristic. This is in line with the chessplayer-
windsurfer argument given in Figure 1. We return to heterogeneity in the
next section.
[Figure 3 about here]
As discussed above the normality assumption implies that a share of
15Given our selected sample of relatively high educated, the 400 USD corresponds to
about 6% of the average earnings of 6400 USD. This appears very high.
16￿ Hypothetical bias￿ is a well-known problem in the contingent valuation literature.
It refers to the experience from several studies that individuals in hypothetical situations
tend to bias their intentions upwards as compared to their choices in real action situations.
14the respondents have a WtP below zero. These shares are given in the
second column of Table 6.17 Arguably, such shares have to be interpreted
pragmatically and with caution as they are, at least to some degree, an
outcome of the assumed normality.
5.2 Heterogeneity in Individual Preferences
In personnel economics models, the provision of bene￿ts and nonmonetary
job attributes is motivated by rational behavior and e¢ ciency as ￿rms are
trying to attract the types of workers they desire. It is, therefore, of interest
to examine how the willingness to pay for fringe bene￿ts and job amenities
varies across individuals with di⁄erent observable characteristics.
The parameter estimates for several of the interaction-terms reveal sig-
ni￿cant di⁄erences in WtP for the fringe bene￿ts and job amenities included
in our model and most of them appear intuitively plausible. For instance,
women value ￿ exibility and employer provided training signi￿cantly higher
than men, see Table 7. This is in line with a general ￿nding that women par-
ticipate in training more often than men (Trepartsudvalget, 2006). Bender
et al. (2005) also ￿nd that women value job ￿ exibility considerably higher
than men in terms of job satisfaction, possibly because greater ￿ exibility
facilitates balancing work and family life, which traditionally has received
more attention from females than males, see Datta Gupta and Stratton
(2010) for a recent time-use study among Danish couples.
[Table 7 about here]
Flexibility is also valued higher by high-wage earners, the older part of
the workforce and by respondents who have children below 6 years of age.
One could hypothesize that employees with relatively long commuting times
also would value ￿ exibility more. However, respondents in our sample gen-
erally commute relatively short spells (the 75th percentile is 35 minutes) and
17Given the random coe¢ cents are assumed normally distributed, the share below zero
can be computed as 100 ￿ ￿(
bk
￿k); where ￿() denotes the cumulative standard normal
distribution, bk the mean estimate and ￿k the estimated standard deviation.
15commuting time is not found to have a signi￿cant impact on respondents￿
WtP for any of the job amenities and fringe bene￿ts.18
The elderly part of the workforce values bonuses and the possibility of
having employer-provided home-pc and internet access signi￿cantly lower
than their younger peers. Age, on the other hand, does not appear to have
a signi￿cant impact on the value attributed to health packages or employer
provided training. Especially the latter result is somewhat surprising as
elderly workers cannot reap bene￿ts from training over as many years as
their younger colleagues.19
An employee characteristic which is not observed in our data, but is likely
to in￿ uence individuals￿choices of compensation packages, is risk aversion.
A growing, mainly experimental literature has shown that females are on
average more risk averse than males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and there
is also evidence of risk aversion increasing with age (Barsky et al., 1997).
According to the interaction term estimates there is no signi￿cant gender
di⁄erence in the willingness to pay for bonuses. However, for the elderly
respondents we do ￿nd that they value bonuses signi￿cantly less positively
(in fact even negatively) than younger employees.
The observation that the older part of the work force does not value
health insurance signi￿cantly higher than the average respondent is also
somewhat surprising. Notice here that physical health is included as a con-
trol variable, and that ￿ old￿include respondents up to 64 years of age only.
Finally, we may note that the ￿less educated￿ in our sample, i.e., re-
spondents with a short college degree or less, value the longest training
signi￿cantly less than respondents with a higher education. This is con-
sistent with lower returns to training among low educated as a result of
complementarity in skill acquisition; see e.g., Cunha and Heckman (2007).
Furthermore, highly educated individuals are likely to obtain more utility
from time spent in training.
18Our threshold for "long commute" is de￿ned as those above the 75
th percentile.
19We also asked respondents about their expected age of retirement. This allows us to
compute the expected number of years left in the work force. However, this also turned
out to be completely unrelated to the WtP for training.
165.3 Compensation Packages as Sorting Devices
A key insight from the personnel economics literature, see e.g., Lazear and
Shaw (2007), is that fringe bene￿ts and job amenities can be used by employ-
ers as an instrument for sorting employees. While the argument is intuitively
persuasive, there is little empirical evidence to support it.
It is di¢ cult to test for sorting also within the setup of this paper.
However, we may ￿nd indications of sorting if, for instance, individuals
who receive more training also are found to have a higher willingness to pay
for training. In general, if sorting is important, we would expect to ￿nd
that the WtP for a given bene￿t is higher among employees who currently
receive the bene￿t in question than among those who do not.
[Table 8 about here]
We do ￿nd suggestive evidence of sorting, see Table 8. All interaction
terms with the respondent￿ s situation in her current job attach positive
parameter estimates although not all of them di⁄er signi￿cantly from zero.
The indications of sorting only appear for relatively high levels of health
insurance, ￿ exibility and training. This is intuitively appealing since sorting
arguably is more likely to arise if the magnitude of the fringe or amenity
provided exceeds a certain threshold level.
It is important to emphasize that the results in Table 8 do not prove the
occurrence of sorting. An alternative explanation may be that in certain
occupations it simply does not make sense to provide an employee with a
home pc and internet to perform the job tasks (a bus driver for example).
In this case, it would be erroneous to conclude that the di⁄erences in WtP
indicate that employees actually sorted, since ￿sorting￿allude to the idea
that they chose their current job over another ￿similar￿job, which did not
o⁄er the bene￿t or job attribute in question.
In order to investigate this a bit further we re-estimate the model for
speci￿c sub-samples. Most job openings relevant to our selected sample of
respondents would include some degree of ￿ exibility and some amount of
on-the-job training. However, "pc + internet" and the health packages are
17mainly o⁄ered to speci￿c groups.
First, it is likely that individuals with relatively low levels of education
are in jobs where the use of home pc and internet connection is of little
relevance. Such employees likely place a lower value on home pc and internet
as a fringe bene￿t and in addition, they are less likely to have been o⁄ered
such a compensation package. Indeed, when estimating the model on a sub-
sample of respondents with minimum some college education, the di⁄erence
from the average WtP-estimates for "pc + internet" drops from an extra
307% (Table 8) to 141%. This remains a very high increased willingness to
pay. Sorting may explain some of this di⁄erence.
Second, the use of health packages is very common in the private sector,
but not in the public sector. In our sample, 3% of the public sector employees
state that they receive some type of health package. The corresponding
number among private sector workers is 64%. Hence, signs of sorting should
mainly be found by comparing private sector workers with some type of
health package in their current job to other private sector workers with no
health package in their current job. This comparison yields a di⁄erence in
the willingness to pay for the large health package of 26%, compared to 44%
in Table 8. The di⁄erence remains insigni￿cant for the small health package.
Albeit no ultimate proof, the sub-sample estimates still provide indications
of sorting.
6 Discussion
Our mixed logit analysis shows that there are fairly large di⁄erences be-
tween individuals in how they value various fringe bene￿ts and that there
are clear trade-o⁄s between wages and fringes as predicted by hedonic wage
theory. Moreover, we ￿nd that the willingness to pay for speci￿c fringe ben-
e￿ts di⁄er between demographic groups. For instance, females, employees
with children under school age and elderly workers place a higher value on
working time ￿ exibility. Obviously, this has some implications both for poli-
cies for balancing work and family life as well as for increasing labor force
participation among elderly workers.
18Furthermore, when there is a choice between di⁄erent quantities of the
fringe bene￿t, the di⁄erence in willingness to pay for the larger quantity does
not ￿save training ￿di⁄er from that for the smaller quantity. This may be
interpreted as indicating that the bene￿ts to some extent are conceived of
as gifts or as signals that the employer is concerned about them and the
employees are willing to reciprocate by paying for them; see e.g., Baron and
Kreps (1999), pp. 302⁄, for a discussion. Note, that the notion of a bene￿t
as a gift depends crucially on which motives the employer is considered to
have for providing them. Unlike training, which is likely to be considered
by the employee to bene￿t the ￿rm more directly, working time ￿ exibility
and a health insurance package are conceived of as meeting special needs of
the employee, and therefore, the willingness to pay for them does not vary
with the amount o⁄ered.
The considerable heterogeneity in individuals￿tastes for the various fringe
bene￿ts could be interpreted as support for use of cafeteria-style compensa-
tion plans, according to which the employee can choose between a number of
bene￿ts within a given budget set in advance by the employer. However, use
of cafeteria plans makes it di¢ cult for employers to utilize fringe bene￿ts as
an employee sorting device. Our analysis in section 5.3 above provides some
suggestive evidence of employers using fringe bene￿ts as a means of sorting
workers. This in line with Oyer (2008) who looks at whether employees
likely to value a fringe bene￿t are more likely to also receive it, whereas we
compare the employee￿ s willingness to pay for a bene￿t with its presence
in her actual compensation package. Our result underscores that sorting is
more than a theoretical construct and that indeed, people do respond to
nonmonetary rewards.
The vignettes method also has the potential advantage that it can be
used not only for research but also has a potential for helping employers in
designing compensation packages for their employees. However, as our exer-
cise has demonstrated the method also has a number of potential limitations
worth pointing out. One is that the number of mixed parameters to be esti-
mated has to be kept fairly low otherwise the computational burden grows
very fast. A weakness of the method one needs to be aware of is that the
19estimates may be upward biased because of the hypothetical bias problem.
However, relative valuations between types of nonmonetary rewards as well
as between individuals with varying characteristics should not be a⁄ected
by such bias. Our results concur with this rationale as they generally show
the expected relative di⁄erences.
7 Conclusion
Previous studies of fringe bene￿ts have focused primarily on the cost side.
The idea is that when the employer can acquire the fringe goods cheaper
than the employees or when they are associated with a tax arbitrage, the
likelihood that the value of a fringe bene￿t to an employee exceeds the ￿rm￿ s
costs of providing it is higher. The focus in this paper di⁄ers insofar that we
examine directly individuals￿valuations of the fringe bene￿ts by estimating
their willingness to pay for them.
For this purpose we make use of a method, building vignettes and merg-
ing them with survey data, which is new within this area of research. This
allows us to solve some of the problems that have plagued the earlier lit-
erature, like unobserved heterogeneity in ability, di⁄erences in tastes for
di⁄erent fringe bene￿ts and the selectivity due to non-randomness of job
changes.
All in all, our ￿ndings lend strong support to a key notion in the economic
analysis of employment relationships, that nonmonetary job attributes can
be monetized. As emphasized by Lazear and Shaw (2007) this is important
as it implies that any model in personnel economics can be applied to non-
monetary as well as monetary rewards. For instance, the tournament model,
whereby the possibility of future promotions and wage increases induce lower
ranked workers to perform better, also applies to status and prestige, not
only monetary rewards. Moreover, this paper has shown the potential of
the vignettes method in measuring willingness-to-pay for job attributes in
contexts where conventional data collection is di¢ cult, if not impossible.
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Figure 2   Vignette Example 
 
 
  Job A    Job B 
Home-pc + ADSL internet  
 





Work hours flexibility 
 
 
Annual bonus (equivalent to 
one month’s pay) 
 
Monthly wage before tax 
Yes 
 
No continuous training  
 
Complete insurance including access to 
operation and medical specialist 
 
Work hours are decided by the company 
with no possibility for changes 
 
No chance of bonus 
 
 
















Yes, 5 days/year 
 
No health insurance is offered 
 
 
You may freely decide on your work 
hours 
 
No chance of bonus 
 
 










Table 1  Frequency distribution of bonuses in respondent’s current job 
 
 
Table 2  Frequency distribution of fringe benefits, 2008 
 
Note: The question read: “Which fringe benefits did you receive in 2008 in relation to your main occupation?” 
 
Table 3  Amount of continuous training paid by employer, 2008 
 
Note: The question read: “Did you in 2008 participate in any training paid by your employer, and if yes how long did the training 
last? (If more than one training spell, please state the total duration of training days in 2008)”. 
 
Frequency Percent
Yes, equivalent to less than 5% of annual salary 452 14.6
Yes, equivalent to between 5 and 10% of annual salary 222 7.2
Yes, equivalent to more than 10% of annual salary 127 4.1
No, I did not receive any bonus or the like 2,270 73.4
Don't know 23 0.7
Received Frequency Percent
No fringe benefits 581 18.8
Health insurance 1,079 34.9
Internet and pc 820 26.5
Free telephone 572 18.5
Free fruit 1,593 51.5
Free coffee 2,024 65.4
Company car 124 4.0
Membership of fitness club or similar 235 7.6
Don't know 37 1.2
Other 367 11.9
Frequency Percent
Yes, up to 5 working days 1,050 33.9
Yes, 5-10 working days (1-2 weeks) 442 14.3
Yes, 11-20 working days (2-4 weeks) 194 6.3
Yes, 21-60 working days (1-3 months) 84 2.7
Yes, 61 working days or more (more than 3 months) 23 0.7
No, but I have previously attended training courses 792 25.6
No, I have never attended any training 477 15.4
Don't know 32 1.028 
 
Table 4  Results from Logit and Mixed logit models 





Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Mean Wage 5.014 0.356 ** 9.130 0.715 ** 10.008 0.774 **
Small health package 0.579 0.042 ** 1.009 0.090 ** 1.179 0.120 **
Large health package 0.625 0.058 ** 1.175 0.119 ** 1.200 0.153 **
Some flexibility 1.633 0.051 ** 2.808 0.155 ** 2.662 0.175 **
High flexibility 1.590 0.050 ** 2.864 0.159 ** 2.644 0.175 **
Training 2 days 0.386 0.059 ** 0.610 0.103 ** 0.551 0.147 **
Training 5 days 0.990 0.061 ** 1.518 0.116 ** 1.326 0.152 **
Training 2 weeks 0.374 0.067 ** 0.609 0.123 ** 0.561 0.161 **
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.642 0.063 ** 0.251 0.101 ** 1.398 0.154 **
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.621 0.051 ** -0.177 0.165 1.188 0.138 **
PC+internet 0.374 0.038 ** 0.713 0.075 ** 0.555 0.095 **
Mean interaction
(Wage> median) x Small health package -0.250 0.150
Large health package 0.075 0.187
Some flexibility 0.398 0.184 *
High flexibility 0.665 0.181 **
Training 2 days 0.146 0.202
Training 5 days 0.491 0.202 *
Training 2 weeks 0.225 0.214
Bonus w. 25% chance -0.043 0.179
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.100 0.175
PC+internet 0.335 0.121 **
Small health package 0.629 0.246 ** 0.715 0.194 **
Large health package 1.288 0.203 ** 1.217 0.230 **
Some flexibility 1.401 0.162 ** 1.350 0.166 **
High flexibility 1.967 0.185 ** 1.955 0.173 **
Training 2 days 1.198 0.285 ** 1.322 0.253 **
Training 5 days 1.289 0.219 ** 1.338 0.230 **
Training 2 weeks 1.456 0.244 ** 1.403 0.251 **
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.018 0.216 0.208 0.237 **
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.872 0.215 ** 1.264 0.251 **




Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)








Table 5  WtP for Bonus using different distributional assumptions for the mixing distribution 
 
Note: The estimated model is Model (3) in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 6  Willingness to Pay (in USD) for Vignette Attributes, Mean Estimates and Share Below Zero 
 










Mean Bonus 25 256 254
Bonus 50 217 228
Standard Deviation Bonus 25 38 42
Bonus 50 231 266
Log-likelihood -4618.2 -4618.0
WtP (USD) % below zero
Small health package 189 0%
Large health package 189 21%
Some flexibility 394 7%
High flexibility 403 13%
Training 2 days 63 40%
Training 5 days 245 13%
Training 2 weeks 106 31%
Bonus w. 25% chance 243 0%
Bonus w. 50% chance 240 15%
PC+internet 112 20%30 
 
 
Figure 3  Distribution of Willingness-to-Pay for Flexibility 
 
Note: The Figure is based on simulations with 10,000 draws from a normal distribution using  























-1000 0 1000 2000
USD/month
Some flexibility High flexibility31 
 
 
Table 7  Difference from mean Willingness to Pay Estimates across Observables, in percent  
 








Age 57 or above






Large health package -43% 48%
Some flexibility 21% 25% 181% 12%
High flexibility 29% 28% 9%
Training 2 days 128%
Training 5 days 33%
Training 2 weeks 81% -81%
Bonus w. 25% chance
Bonus w. 50% chance -46%




Table 8  Differences in Mean Willingness-to-Pay by Characteristics of Current Job, in percent 
 
Note: The “Extra WtP” is the magnitude, in percent, of the estimate of the interaction term between the vignette attribute and an 
indicator  variable  for  whether  the  individual  is  receiving  the  fringe  benefit/job  amenity  in  question  in  her  current  job.  Only 
differences significant at the 5% level are reported. Altering the condition for bonus to respondents who receive a relatively high 
bonus does not yield a significant difference. Other combinations of training days make no qualitative difference either. 
 
Vignette attribute Extra WtP Conditioning on current job
Small health package -- Some health package provided in current job
Large health package 44% Some health package provided in current job
Some flexibility --
Work hours in current job are shifting after 
agreement between employer and employee
High flexibility 29%
Work hours in current job are shifting from day 
to day by respondent's own choice
Training 2 days --
Respondent received 1-4 days of training in 
2008
Training 5 days 57%
Respondent received 5-60 days of training in 
2008
Training 2 weeks 229%
Respondent received 5-60 days of training in 
2008
Bonus w. 25% chance -- Respondent received bonus in 2008
Bonus w. 50% chance -- Respondent received bonus in 2008
PC+internet 307% Respondent received PC+internet in 200833 
 
Appendix B: Details on the Vignettes  
The introductory text reads: 
“Assume that you for one reason or another have you stop at your current job and have to look for a new 
job. 
Assume furthermore, that you in a relatively short time receive several job offers. These will subsequently be 
shown on the screens. These job offers do not differ from you current job except for certain features which 
are emphasized. 
You are asked to compare job offer A (to the left) with job offer B (to the right) and to choose the one that 
you prefer. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers – you should only choose the one of the two you like 
better (even if you maybe do not like any of them)” 
 
Table B1  Possible values of vignette attributes 
Attribute Possible Values
Home-pc + ADSL internet  -Yes
-No




Health insurance -No health insurance is offered
-Access to a few free consultations at medical specialist including psycologist
-Complete insurance including access to operation and medical specialist
Work flexibility -Work hours are decided by the company with no possibility for changes
-You may choose your work hours within certain limits
-You may freely decide on your work hours
Annual bonus (equivalent to 
one month’s pay) -No chance of bonus
-Yes, with 25% chance
-Yes, with 50% chance
Monthly wage before tax -As in current job
-As in current job +/- 5%
-As in current job +/- 10%
-As in current job +/- 15%34 
 
Appendix C:  Additional Tables 
 
Table C1  Means and Min/Max of Background Variables 
 
   
Share (in %) 
or Mean Min Max
Female 50.7 0 1
Education
    high school 10.0 0 1
    vocational education (carpenter etc) 21.3 0 1
    short term college (< 3 years) 15.6 0 1
    medium term college (3-4 years) 33.1 0 1
    university (5 years or more) 20.1 0 1
Monthly gross income (DKK) 34,918 2,500 2,000,000
Monthly gross income (USD) 6,390 458 366,028
Married/cohab 76.0 0 1
Number of children below 6 years of age
    0 children 77.9 0 1
    1 child 14.0 0 1
    2 children 6.8 0 1
    3 children 1.2 0 1
    4 children or more 0.2 0 1
Number of children 6 years or older
    0 children 65.2 0 1
    1 child 17.6 0 1
    2 children 13.8 0 1
    3 children 3.2 0 1
    4 children or more 0.2 0 1
Urbanization
    country-side 12.3 0 1
    <10,000 inhabs 20.4 0 1
    10,000-49,999 inhabs 24.9 0 1
    50,000-99,999 inhabs 12.8 0 1
    100,000 or more inhabs 28.6 0 1
Age 43.4 25 64
Years of labor market experience 19.8 0 48
Years of tenure at current employer 9.2 0 44
Years of tenure in current position 5.8 0 41
Union member 82.6 0 1
Hours worked per week
    according to contract 36.5 30 70








Share (in %) 
or Mean Min Max
Sector
    private 57.0 0 1
    governmental (public) 12.8 0 1
    regional/municipality (public) 30.2 0 1
Minutes to commute home-work 27.5 1 240
Firm Size (workplace)
    less than 10 employees 10.7 0 1
    10-24 employees 14.3 0 1
    25-99 employees 28.0 0 1
    100-499 employees 25.0 0 1
    500 employees or more 22.0 0 1
Coef. Std. Err.
Mean Wage 10.234 0.781 **
Small health package 1.055 0.221 **
Large health package 1.057 0.283 **
Some flexibility 2.203 0.258 **
High flexibility 2.252 0.250 **
Training 2 days 0.355 0.270
Training 5 days 1.368 0.265 **
Training 2 weeks 0.592 0.283 **
Bonus w. 25% chance 1.359 0.254 **
Bonus w. 50% chance 1.344 0.233 **
PC+internet 0.626 0.165 **
SD Small health package 0.163 0.360
Large health package 1.296 0.200 **
Some flexibility 1.504 0.166 **
High flexibility 1.969 0.179 **
Training 2 days 1.419 0.234 **
Training 5 days 1.186 0.249 **
Training 2 weeks 1.238 0.252 **
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.381 0.245
Bonus w. 50% chance 1.289 0.250 **
PC+internet 0.755 0.132 **




Interaction terms with observables (mean) Coef. Std. Err.
(Wage > median)   x Small health package -0.167 0.162
Large health package 0.257 0.207
Some flexibility 0.455 0.203 **
High flexibility 0.650 0.196 **
Training 2 days 0.299 0.224
Training 5 days 0.457 0.218 **
Training 2 weeks 0.247 0.235
Bonus w. 25% chance -0.042 0.196
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.082 0.187
PC+internet 0.328 0.132 **
Female   x Small health package 0.217 0.155
Large health package 0.082 0.198
Some flexibility 0.546 0.195 **
High flexibility 0.626 0.189 **
Training 2 days 0.454 0.215 *
Training 5 days 0.454 0.208 *
Training 2 weeks 0.481 0.223 *
Bonus w. 25% chance -0.024 0.187
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.105 0.180
PC+internet -0.014 0.126
Good physical health  x Small health package 0.033 0.137
Large health package -0.458 0.195 *
Age 57 or above  x Small health package -0.153 0.243
Large health package 0.392 0.312
Some flexibility 0.760 0.309 *
High flexibility 0.438 0.307
Training 2 days -0.137 0.323
Training 5 days 0.137 0.312
Training 2 weeks 0.011 0.334
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.110 0.291
Bonus w. 50% chance -0.623 0.292 *
PC+internet -0.472 0.203 *
(continued next page)37 
 
 
Note: Significance at the 5% level denoted by *. Significance at the 1% level denoted by **. Mixing parameters normally distributed. 
(Table C2 continued) Coef. Std. Err.
Child below age 6  x Small health package -0.063 0.074
Large health package 0.081 0.096
Some flexibility 0.262 0.096 **
High flexibility 0.211 0.091 *
Training 2 days -0.086 0.103
Training 5 days -0.070 0.100
Training 2 weeks -0.085 0.107
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.094 0.090
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.005 0.089
PC+internet -0.023 0.061
Short term college or 
lower education  x Small health package 0.120 0.154
Large health package 0.509 0.199 *
Some flexibility -0.135 0.195
High flexibility -0.278 0.186
Training 2 days 0.055 0.213
Training 5 days -0.329 0.207
Training 2 weeks -0.479 0.224 *
Bonus w. 25% chance 0.119 0.187
Bonus w. 50% chance -0.295 0.181
PC+internet -0.077 0.127
Long commuting time  x Small health package -0.039 0.177
Large health package 0.130 0.225
Some flexibility -0.049 0.220
High flexibility 0.228 0.214
Training 2 days -0.079 0.241
Training 5 days -0.089 0.233
Training 2 weeks 0.028 0.250
Bonus w. 25% chance -0.065 0.211
Bonus w. 50% chance 0.019 0.206
PC+internet 0.170 0.141